1 00:00:05,390 --> 00:00:03,710 so the big report is finally here the 2 00:00:07,789 --> 00:00:05,400 preliminary assessment of the 3 00:00:09,110 --> 00:00:07,799 unidentified aerial phenomenon Office of 4 00:00:11,030 --> 00:00:09,120 the Director of National Intelligence 5 00:00:14,390 --> 00:00:11,040 unclassified report 6 00:00:15,650 --> 00:00:14,400 25th June 2021. I've looked at the 7 00:00:17,390 --> 00:00:15,660 report I've gone through it a couple of 8 00:00:20,090 --> 00:00:17,400 times but I want to what I want to do 9 00:00:23,269 --> 00:00:20,100 now is go through it again and kind of 10 00:00:25,609 --> 00:00:23,279 give my take on it now long story short 11 00:00:27,170 --> 00:00:25,619 I am fairly happy with the report I 12 00:00:29,509 --> 00:00:27,180 think it kind of more or less says what 13 00:00:30,769 --> 00:00:29,519 I've been saying uh for a long time that 14 00:00:32,749 --> 00:00:30,779 there's a bunch of different things we 15 00:00:33,770 --> 00:00:32,759 don't have enough information there's 16 00:00:35,870 --> 00:00:33,780 always going to be things that are 17 00:00:38,030 --> 00:00:35,880 unidentified there are things like birds 18 00:00:39,310 --> 00:00:38,040 and balloons that are going to show up 19 00:00:41,750 --> 00:00:39,320 on sensors 20 00:00:43,310 --> 00:00:41,760 and we should 21 00:00:44,709 --> 00:00:43,320 um we should try to figure out what 22 00:00:47,810 --> 00:00:44,719 these things are 23 00:00:50,630 --> 00:00:47,820 and oh no evidence of aliens no great 24 00:00:52,910 --> 00:00:50,640 evidence of amazing technology but not 25 00:00:54,410 --> 00:00:52,920 everyone agrees with that assessment so 26 00:00:57,770 --> 00:00:54,420 what I want to do is go through the 27 00:00:59,389 --> 00:00:57,780 report and try to explain uh what I see 28 00:01:01,430 --> 00:00:59,399 in the report and what justifies that 29 00:01:02,630 --> 00:01:01,440 assessment okay 30 00:01:06,590 --> 00:01:02,640 so 31 00:01:08,450 --> 00:01:06,600 page two scope and assumptions uh this 32 00:01:11,090 --> 00:01:08,460 basically tells us like who does the 33 00:01:12,770 --> 00:01:11,100 report and uh where they got all the 34 00:01:15,050 --> 00:01:12,780 information from the only important 35 00:01:17,570 --> 00:01:15,060 thing on this page really is this 36 00:01:19,670 --> 00:01:17,580 assumption at the end it says various 37 00:01:22,130 --> 00:01:19,680 forms of sensors that register UAP 38 00:01:24,170 --> 00:01:22,140 generally operate correctly and capture 39 00:01:27,050 --> 00:01:24,180 enough real data to allow initial 40 00:01:29,810 --> 00:01:27,060 assessments but some UAP may be 41 00:01:31,730 --> 00:01:29,820 attributable to sensor anomalies 42 00:01:34,730 --> 00:01:31,740 basically that means that most of the 43 00:01:38,749 --> 00:01:34,740 time the radar works and the atflier 44 00:01:41,870 --> 00:01:38,759 system works but sometimes it does not 45 00:01:46,249 --> 00:01:41,880 and uh when it does not that may create 46 00:01:48,649 --> 00:01:46,259 a report of a UAP 47 00:01:49,969 --> 00:01:48,659 this page page three the executive 48 00:01:51,770 --> 00:01:49,979 summary now this is kind of the 49 00:01:54,410 --> 00:01:51,780 important page it has all the most 50 00:01:57,050 --> 00:01:54,420 important information and conclusions 51 00:01:58,609 --> 00:01:57,060 and some of the latest stuff even though 52 00:02:00,709 --> 00:01:58,619 it should be more detailed actually 53 00:02:03,170 --> 00:02:00,719 amidst some of the stuff that was listed 54 00:02:06,830 --> 00:02:03,180 here so you really need to refer to this 55 00:02:08,630 --> 00:02:06,840 page whenever you um 56 00:02:10,669 --> 00:02:08,640 whenever you look at something that 57 00:02:13,010 --> 00:02:10,679 comes later in the report okay executive 58 00:02:15,229 --> 00:02:13,020 summary the limited amount of high 59 00:02:17,390 --> 00:02:15,239 quality reporting on unidentified aerial 60 00:02:19,430 --> 00:02:17,400 phenomena hampers our ability to draw 61 00:02:22,309 --> 00:02:19,440 firm conclusions about the nature or 62 00:02:23,330 --> 00:02:22,319 intent of UAP so they're basically 63 00:02:26,449 --> 00:02:23,340 saying they don't have enough 64 00:02:30,170 --> 00:02:26,459 information to know what the nature of 65 00:02:31,550 --> 00:02:30,180 the problem is or if the UAP means 66 00:02:35,449 --> 00:02:31,560 something I'm not sure what that really 67 00:02:38,509 --> 00:02:35,459 means like aliens meaning something 68 00:02:41,089 --> 00:02:38,519 okay the UAP task force considered a 69 00:02:42,949 --> 00:02:41,099 range of information on UAP described in 70 00:02:45,350 --> 00:02:42,959 U.S military and intelligence Community 71 00:02:48,050 --> 00:02:45,360 reporting but because the reporting 72 00:02:49,729 --> 00:02:48,060 lacks sufficient specificity ultimately 73 00:02:51,410 --> 00:02:49,739 recognize that a unique tailored 74 00:02:53,390 --> 00:02:51,420 reporting process was required to 75 00:02:55,250 --> 00:02:53,400 provide sufficient data for analysis of 76 00:02:58,250 --> 00:02:55,260 UAP events 77 00:03:00,250 --> 00:02:58,260 as a result the uaptf concentrated its 78 00:03:03,710 --> 00:03:00,260 review on reports that occurred between 79 00:03:06,110 --> 00:03:03,720 2004 and 2021 which is basically meaning 80 00:03:08,570 --> 00:03:06,120 they started with the Nimitz encounter 81 00:03:10,490 --> 00:03:08,580 and went up to the present day 82 00:03:12,229 --> 00:03:10,500 the majority of which are the result of 83 00:03:14,270 --> 00:03:12,239 this new tailored process to better 84 00:03:15,949 --> 00:03:14,280 capture UAP events through formalized 85 00:03:18,710 --> 00:03:15,959 reporting which is good that means that 86 00:03:20,330 --> 00:03:18,720 our the majority of the reports here are 87 00:03:23,509 --> 00:03:20,340 actually quite high quality where 88 00:03:25,970 --> 00:03:23,519 they've standardized how the reports 89 00:03:29,330 --> 00:03:25,980 um were taken 90 00:03:31,970 --> 00:03:29,340 now this is an interesting point most of 91 00:03:34,309 --> 00:03:31,980 the UAP reported probably do represent 92 00:03:36,949 --> 00:03:34,319 physical objects given that a majority 93 00:03:39,410 --> 00:03:36,959 of UAP were registered across multiple 94 00:03:42,530 --> 00:03:39,420 sensors to include radar infrared 95 00:03:44,809 --> 00:03:42,540 Electro Optical weapon Seekers and 96 00:03:48,170 --> 00:03:44,819 visual observations 97 00:03:52,369 --> 00:03:48,180 now this most of the UOB reported 98 00:03:55,070 --> 00:03:52,379 actually is 80. it's 80 out of 144 which 99 00:03:55,990 --> 00:03:55,080 is 56 percent which is a bit more than 100 00:03:59,570 --> 00:03:56,000 half 101 00:04:02,149 --> 00:03:59,580 so I think saying most of is perhaps a 102 00:04:05,229 --> 00:04:02,159 bit of an exaggeration because that 103 00:04:07,490 --> 00:04:05,239 means that a bit less than half of them 104 00:04:09,710 --> 00:04:07,500 were not registered across multiple 105 00:04:11,509 --> 00:04:09,720 sensors they were just registered on One 106 00:04:12,670 --> 00:04:11,519 sensor or they were just an eyewitness 107 00:04:16,370 --> 00:04:12,680 account 108 00:04:18,949 --> 00:04:16,380 so we could perhaps say that more than 109 00:04:22,510 --> 00:04:18,959 half of the UAP report it probably do 110 00:04:24,290 --> 00:04:22,520 represent physical objects 111 00:04:26,210 --> 00:04:24,300 now 112 00:04:29,330 --> 00:04:26,220 again in the very important paragraph 113 00:04:32,689 --> 00:04:29,340 here in a limited number of incidents 114 00:04:35,390 --> 00:04:32,699 UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit 115 00:04:37,370 --> 00:04:35,400 unusual flight characteristics 116 00:04:40,370 --> 00:04:37,380 now that's you know 117 00:04:42,950 --> 00:04:40,380 the money uh there and that's you know 118 00:04:46,010 --> 00:04:42,960 are these alien spaceships or advanced 119 00:04:48,770 --> 00:04:46,020 technology from other countries 120 00:04:51,469 --> 00:04:48,780 they continue these observations could 121 00:04:54,050 --> 00:04:51,479 be the result of sensor errors spoofing 122 00:04:57,290 --> 00:04:54,060 or Observer misperceptions and require 123 00:04:59,629 --> 00:04:57,300 additional rigorous analysis 124 00:05:01,550 --> 00:04:59,639 so basically they're saying that uh 125 00:05:04,610 --> 00:05:01,560 there are situations that seem to be 126 00:05:07,370 --> 00:05:04,620 amazing but they can't tell if they 127 00:05:09,590 --> 00:05:07,380 actually are they can't tell if they are 128 00:05:12,290 --> 00:05:09,600 in fact uh sensor errors spoofing or 129 00:05:14,810 --> 00:05:12,300 Observer misperceptions now compare that 130 00:05:16,730 --> 00:05:14,820 to the previous paragraph where most of 131 00:05:19,070 --> 00:05:16,740 them actually represent physical objects 132 00:05:20,689 --> 00:05:19,080 because they were on multiple sensors I 133 00:05:22,550 --> 00:05:20,699 think it's pretty clear that these ones 134 00:05:24,710 --> 00:05:22,560 that they're talking about the UAP that 135 00:05:27,350 --> 00:05:24,720 reportedly appear to exhibit unusual 136 00:05:30,529 --> 00:05:27,360 flight characteristics are not included 137 00:05:32,350 --> 00:05:30,539 in those uh probably physical objects 138 00:05:35,390 --> 00:05:32,360 because if they were 139 00:05:37,610 --> 00:05:35,400 uh represented registered on multiple 140 00:05:40,070 --> 00:05:37,620 sensors that would prove pretty much 141 00:05:41,510 --> 00:05:40,080 without the shadow of a doubt that there 142 00:05:42,529 --> 00:05:41,520 were in fact 143 00:05:44,330 --> 00:05:42,539 um 144 00:05:45,650 --> 00:05:44,340 exhibiting unusual polite 145 00:05:47,810 --> 00:05:45,660 characteristics 146 00:05:50,029 --> 00:05:47,820 so it seems fairly likely that this 147 00:05:53,510 --> 00:05:50,039 paragraph refers to things that were 148 00:05:56,029 --> 00:05:53,520 essentially single sensor or single 149 00:05:58,730 --> 00:05:56,039 eyewitness account reports it's not 150 00:06:00,350 --> 00:05:58,740 entirely clear but it would seem to be 151 00:06:03,409 --> 00:06:00,360 that way for if you combine the 152 00:06:05,689 --> 00:06:03,419 information in these two paragraphs 153 00:06:07,790 --> 00:06:05,699 there are probably multiple types of UAP 154 00:06:09,170 --> 00:06:07,800 requiring different explanations based 155 00:06:10,969 --> 00:06:09,180 on the range of appearances and 156 00:06:12,469 --> 00:06:10,979 behaviors described in the available 157 00:06:15,830 --> 00:06:12,479 reporting 158 00:06:17,330 --> 00:06:15,840 well yes yes this is this is true and 159 00:06:19,610 --> 00:06:17,340 this is something I've been saying for 160 00:06:21,529 --> 00:06:19,620 months if not years 161 00:06:24,110 --> 00:06:21,539 and that we don't just have one thing we 162 00:06:25,909 --> 00:06:24,120 don't just have uaps what are they we 163 00:06:27,050 --> 00:06:25,919 have here's the UOB report here's a 164 00:06:28,610 --> 00:06:27,060 different one here's another one here's 165 00:06:31,189 --> 00:06:28,620 another one there could be all kinds of 166 00:06:33,710 --> 00:06:31,199 different explanations and they've 167 00:06:36,110 --> 00:06:33,720 categorized them into four five five 168 00:06:38,749 --> 00:06:36,120 broad categories uh five potential 169 00:06:41,990 --> 00:06:38,759 explanatory categories Airborne clutter 170 00:06:44,990 --> 00:06:42,000 natural atmospheric phenomena U.S 171 00:06:50,570 --> 00:06:45,000 development programs foreign adversary 172 00:06:56,510 --> 00:06:54,170 UAP clearly pose a safety of light issue 173 00:06:58,490 --> 00:06:56,520 and may pose a challenge to U.S national 174 00:06:59,930 --> 00:06:58,500 security and there's obviously something 175 00:07:01,969 --> 00:06:59,940 that's very important and hence we need 176 00:07:03,890 --> 00:07:01,979 to look into what this UAP actually are 177 00:07:06,469 --> 00:07:03,900 these various different UAP 178 00:07:08,689 --> 00:07:06,479 safety concerns primarily Center on 179 00:07:11,390 --> 00:07:08,699 aviators contending with an increasingly 180 00:07:13,790 --> 00:07:11,400 cluttered air domain which really is the 181 00:07:15,969 --> 00:07:13,800 first of the the five categories the 182 00:07:18,170 --> 00:07:15,979 Airborne clutter 183 00:07:19,969 --> 00:07:18,180 uaps would also represent a national 184 00:07:22,129 --> 00:07:19,979 security challenge if they are foreign 185 00:07:23,689 --> 00:07:22,139 adversary collection platforms there's a 186 00:07:26,809 --> 00:07:23,699 spy things I mean they're really talking 187 00:07:29,089 --> 00:07:26,819 about spy drones there for example or 188 00:07:30,529 --> 00:07:29,099 balloons or provide evidence a potential 189 00:07:32,150 --> 00:07:30,539 adversary has developed either a 190 00:07:34,249 --> 00:07:32,160 breakthrough or disruptive technology 191 00:07:36,050 --> 00:07:34,259 let's see if they do actually in fact 192 00:07:38,689 --> 00:07:36,060 demonstrate 193 00:07:40,790 --> 00:07:38,699 unusual flight characteristics which we 194 00:07:43,850 --> 00:07:40,800 can't say for sure because we don't have 195 00:07:48,409 --> 00:07:46,610 and then they talk about consolidation 196 00:07:50,450 --> 00:07:48,419 of reports across the government 197 00:07:52,850 --> 00:07:50,460 standardized reporting et cetera Warrior 198 00:07:54,710 --> 00:07:52,860 would be better and some of these steps 199 00:07:56,990 --> 00:07:54,720 are resource intensive and would require 200 00:07:59,150 --> 00:07:57,000 additional investment so that's just a 201 00:08:01,249 --> 00:07:59,160 call for more money for the UAP test 202 00:08:03,129 --> 00:08:01,259 course which may well be justified but 203 00:08:07,070 --> 00:08:03,139 that's what that paragraph is about 204 00:08:10,670 --> 00:08:07,080 needs more data might need more money 205 00:08:16,909 --> 00:08:13,270 available reporting largely inconclusive 206 00:08:19,309 --> 00:08:16,919 limited data leaves most UAP unexplained 207 00:08:20,770 --> 00:08:19,319 there's the thing uh we don't know what 208 00:08:23,330 --> 00:08:20,780 we're looking at we've got 209 00:08:25,309 --> 00:08:23,340 inconsistent data we've got limited data 210 00:08:28,610 --> 00:08:25,319 and this is a problem 211 00:08:31,969 --> 00:08:28,620 there's no standard reporting methods 212 00:08:34,370 --> 00:08:31,979 lots of anecdotes uh what they focused 213 00:08:36,829 --> 00:08:34,380 on the more recent ones the majority 214 00:08:38,329 --> 00:08:36,839 coming in the last two years which is 215 00:08:39,769 --> 00:08:38,339 great because you know again these are 216 00:08:41,709 --> 00:08:39,779 better quality ones they're not simply 217 00:08:44,029 --> 00:08:41,719 the ones that are 218 00:08:45,230 --> 00:08:44,039 limited by the previous reporting 219 00:08:47,449 --> 00:08:45,240 process 220 00:08:49,310 --> 00:08:47,459 we were able to identify one reported 221 00:08:51,769 --> 00:08:49,320 UAP with high confidence well that's 222 00:08:54,410 --> 00:08:51,779 rather a low number of uh of solved 223 00:08:56,930 --> 00:08:54,420 cases but again you know the reason that 224 00:08:58,970 --> 00:08:56,940 uaps are uaps is that we don't have 225 00:09:00,470 --> 00:08:58,980 enough information and it's quite often 226 00:09:03,170 --> 00:09:00,480 difficult to get more information so 227 00:09:05,050 --> 00:09:03,180 it's not surprising that if something is 228 00:09:07,670 --> 00:09:05,060 unidentified once it stays unidentified 229 00:09:10,070 --> 00:09:07,680 the the videos that I've looked at I've 230 00:09:11,449 --> 00:09:10,080 not identified what the the things are 231 00:09:13,009 --> 00:09:11,459 I've just identified various 232 00:09:15,230 --> 00:09:13,019 characteristics of them that aren't 233 00:09:17,990 --> 00:09:15,240 exactly what people say the gimbal not 234 00:09:19,970 --> 00:09:18,000 actually rotating the go fast video not 235 00:09:21,410 --> 00:09:19,980 actually going fast the triangle not 236 00:09:22,430 --> 00:09:21,420 actually being a triangle that type of 237 00:09:23,690 --> 00:09:22,440 thing but it doesn't mean they've 238 00:09:25,430 --> 00:09:23,700 identified them so they're still 239 00:09:27,290 --> 00:09:25,440 unidentified 240 00:09:29,990 --> 00:09:27,300 okay in one case we identified the 241 00:09:32,210 --> 00:09:30,000 object as a large deflating balloon 242 00:09:34,009 --> 00:09:32,220 I don't know what that is uh it could be 243 00:09:36,710 --> 00:09:34,019 the go fast if that if it's like a 244 00:09:38,509 --> 00:09:36,720 slowly leaking balloon uh it will 245 00:09:39,769 --> 00:09:38,519 eventually achieve neutral buoyancy and 246 00:09:42,590 --> 00:09:39,779 that will mean it will stay at a certain 247 00:09:45,230 --> 00:09:42,600 altitude for a period of time just 248 00:09:48,410 --> 00:09:45,240 slowly drift down as it continues to 249 00:09:50,990 --> 00:09:48,420 leak so that could be 250 00:09:52,730 --> 00:09:51,000 uh one of the cases to go fast it could 251 00:09:53,990 --> 00:09:52,740 actually be the Omaha spear that was 252 00:09:55,310 --> 00:09:54,000 descending into the water but that 253 00:09:57,470 --> 00:09:55,320 doesn't really look like a balloon but 254 00:09:59,269 --> 00:09:57,480 uh it would be nice to know which case 255 00:10:02,170 --> 00:09:59,279 they were actually talking about 256 00:10:05,569 --> 00:10:02,180 the others remain unexplained 257 00:10:08,630 --> 00:10:05,579 144 reports originated from the U.S 258 00:10:10,790 --> 00:10:08,640 government sources of these 80 reports 259 00:10:13,670 --> 00:10:10,800 involved observations with multiple 260 00:10:17,449 --> 00:10:13,680 sensors so that's again 56 percent uh 80 261 00:10:22,069 --> 00:10:17,459 out of 144 which means that 262 00:10:24,110 --> 00:10:22,079 um is 64 of them uh do not 64 of them 263 00:10:28,610 --> 00:10:24,120 were in fact just observations from 264 00:10:31,550 --> 00:10:28,620 either one sensor or one eyewitness 265 00:10:33,530 --> 00:10:31,560 and most reports described UAP as 266 00:10:35,389 --> 00:10:33,540 objects that interrupted pre-planned 267 00:10:37,490 --> 00:10:35,399 training or other military activities 268 00:10:40,069 --> 00:10:37,500 that's kind of interesting 269 00:10:43,009 --> 00:10:40,079 all right so UAP collection challenges 270 00:10:45,710 --> 00:10:43,019 and they talk about the stigmas uh 271 00:10:47,750 --> 00:10:45,720 that's uh presumably during the last 272 00:10:49,310 --> 00:10:47,760 couple of years that that will be 273 00:10:50,750 --> 00:10:49,320 partially mitigated by having this 274 00:10:53,050 --> 00:10:50,760 standardized reporting and this 275 00:10:55,130 --> 00:10:53,060 encouraging of reporting and since the 276 00:10:57,230 --> 00:10:55,140 majority of the reports are in the last 277 00:10:59,329 --> 00:10:57,240 two years then the stigma should have 278 00:11:00,730 --> 00:10:59,339 less of effect on this particular data 279 00:11:03,949 --> 00:11:00,740 set 280 00:11:05,630 --> 00:11:03,959 uh so the sensors mounted on U.S 281 00:11:08,990 --> 00:11:05,640 military platforms are typically 282 00:11:10,970 --> 00:11:09,000 designed to fulfill specific missions as 283 00:11:14,509 --> 00:11:10,980 a result Those sensors are not generally 284 00:11:16,009 --> 00:11:14,519 suited for identifying UAP 285 00:11:17,930 --> 00:11:16,019 uh part of what they're talking about 286 00:11:19,550 --> 00:11:17,940 here might be the app Leo system which 287 00:11:22,610 --> 00:11:19,560 is this infrared camera system there's a 288 00:11:25,370 --> 00:11:22,620 lot of Navy planes and the atlas system 289 00:11:29,210 --> 00:11:25,380 is a targeting pod it is designed to 290 00:11:31,130 --> 00:11:29,220 Target things it's not designed for 291 00:11:33,470 --> 00:11:31,140 um looking at strange objects and 292 00:11:37,370 --> 00:11:33,480 figuring out what they are it's designed 293 00:11:39,650 --> 00:11:37,380 to get a a high contrast lock visual 294 00:11:42,050 --> 00:11:39,660 lock on an object so it can be tracked 295 00:11:45,230 --> 00:11:42,060 which doesn't mean it necessarily has 296 00:11:47,090 --> 00:11:45,240 the best visual uh look from a human's 297 00:11:50,030 --> 00:11:47,100 perspective it's designed for something 298 00:11:51,889 --> 00:11:50,040 that the uh that missiles can lock onto 299 00:11:53,870 --> 00:11:51,899 so you can the camera can lock onto it 300 00:11:55,910 --> 00:11:53,880 and then you tag it with the laser the 301 00:11:59,269 --> 00:11:55,920 laser locks onto it and then 302 00:12:01,009 --> 00:11:59,279 blows it up so designed for one use 303 00:12:02,750 --> 00:12:01,019 means that other uses such as 304 00:12:03,889 --> 00:12:02,760 identification might be a bit 305 00:12:05,810 --> 00:12:03,899 challenging 306 00:12:08,329 --> 00:12:05,820 and uh 307 00:12:10,490 --> 00:12:08,339 again this may be the case with with 308 00:12:13,670 --> 00:12:10,500 radar in that it is 309 00:12:15,769 --> 00:12:13,680 designed to identify a specific type of 310 00:12:17,750 --> 00:12:15,779 thing which would be enemy planes enemy 311 00:12:20,449 --> 00:12:17,760 missiles and if something is in odd 312 00:12:21,650 --> 00:12:20,459 shape like a balloon it might not be it 313 00:12:23,870 --> 00:12:21,660 might not even show up it might be 314 00:12:25,370 --> 00:12:23,880 filtered out or it might be very 315 00:12:27,590 --> 00:12:25,380 intermittent results or something like 316 00:12:32,389 --> 00:12:30,050 all right the next uh this is kind of a 317 00:12:33,650 --> 00:12:32,399 curiously wordy thing sensor Vantage 318 00:12:35,690 --> 00:12:33,660 points and the number of sensors 319 00:12:37,610 --> 00:12:35,700 concurrently observing an object plays 320 00:12:39,829 --> 00:12:37,620 substantial roles in distinguishing UAP 321 00:12:42,170 --> 00:12:39,839 from known objects and determining 322 00:12:45,290 --> 00:12:42,180 whether a UAP demonstrates breakthrough 323 00:12:47,210 --> 00:12:45,300 Aerospace capabilities now this again is 324 00:12:49,269 --> 00:12:47,220 something I've been saying a lot in the 325 00:12:52,069 --> 00:12:49,279 in slightly better words 326 00:12:54,050 --> 00:12:52,079 basically triangulation 327 00:12:56,030 --> 00:12:54,060 you either want to have two videos 328 00:12:58,129 --> 00:12:56,040 showing the same thing from different 329 00:12:59,990 --> 00:12:58,139 positions so you can you can you can 330 00:13:03,710 --> 00:13:00,000 figure out what's actually going on from 331 00:13:06,350 --> 00:13:03,720 3D or you can have a video and radar of 332 00:13:09,710 --> 00:13:06,360 the same thing now if both 333 00:13:11,569 --> 00:13:09,720 sensor sets show this amazing movement 334 00:13:13,250 --> 00:13:11,579 that means the amazing movement is 335 00:13:16,550 --> 00:13:13,260 almost certainly real 336 00:13:18,350 --> 00:13:16,560 so if we do not have this correct number 337 00:13:21,650 --> 00:13:18,360 of sensors observing these things that 338 00:13:23,170 --> 00:13:21,660 appear to move amazingly then we're not 339 00:13:26,389 --> 00:13:23,180 going to be able to determine if they do 340 00:13:29,269 --> 00:13:26,399 and I think again what's going on here 341 00:13:31,990 --> 00:13:29,279 is in the cases where things appear to 342 00:13:35,389 --> 00:13:32,000 move in an amazing manner 343 00:13:37,910 --> 00:13:35,399 unusual characteristics 344 00:13:39,590 --> 00:13:37,920 we only have one source of data because 345 00:13:41,870 --> 00:13:39,600 if we had more than one we would be able 346 00:13:45,110 --> 00:13:41,880 to definitively say that this was moving 347 00:13:47,509 --> 00:13:45,120 amazingly and like they say here if we 348 00:13:49,370 --> 00:13:47,519 don't then we wouldn't be able to 349 00:13:51,650 --> 00:13:49,380 and they distinguish between Optical 350 00:13:54,050 --> 00:13:51,660 sensors uh have the benefit of providing 351 00:13:56,210 --> 00:13:54,060 some insight into relative size shape 352 00:13:58,370 --> 00:13:56,220 and structure meaning you can just you 353 00:14:00,710 --> 00:13:58,380 can see the thing you get a picture of 354 00:14:02,269 --> 00:14:00,720 it uh like you you have these photos of 355 00:14:05,389 --> 00:14:02,279 things that look like balloons you know 356 00:14:07,189 --> 00:14:05,399 the Batman balloon and uh uh in the 357 00:14:10,250 --> 00:14:07,199 Nimitz encounter you have both TV mode 358 00:14:12,230 --> 00:14:10,260 and IR mode which means that you have 359 00:14:13,310 --> 00:14:12,240 you have a picture of it in invisible 360 00:14:14,810 --> 00:14:13,320 lighting you have a picture of it in 361 00:14:16,610 --> 00:14:14,820 infrared unfortunately both of them 362 00:14:17,750 --> 00:14:16,620 appear to be very out of focus so you 363 00:14:19,430 --> 00:14:17,760 can't really tell very much in that 364 00:14:22,009 --> 00:14:19,440 particular case 365 00:14:24,350 --> 00:14:22,019 uh radio frequency sensors provide more 366 00:14:26,870 --> 00:14:24,360 accurate velocity and range information 367 00:14:29,110 --> 00:14:26,880 because you can use radar this is what 368 00:14:31,790 --> 00:14:29,120 we're talking about radio mostly radar 369 00:14:33,829 --> 00:14:31,800 to measure how far something away is 370 00:14:35,930 --> 00:14:33,839 your time of flight of the radar signal 371 00:14:37,310 --> 00:14:35,940 and the Doppler effect tells you you 372 00:14:39,230 --> 00:14:37,320 know how it's moving and stuff like that 373 00:14:42,710 --> 00:14:39,240 and just basically the 3D positioning 374 00:14:49,670 --> 00:14:42,720 will allow you to track uh its velocity 375 00:14:54,350 --> 00:14:51,769 page five 376 00:14:57,050 --> 00:14:54,360 but some potential patterns do emerge 377 00:14:58,730 --> 00:14:57,060 this is a funny paragraph uh it says 378 00:15:00,350 --> 00:14:58,740 some potential patterns do emerge and 379 00:15:03,530 --> 00:15:00,360 then it basically debunks the entire 380 00:15:05,629 --> 00:15:03,540 thing it says uh although there was wide 381 00:15:07,610 --> 00:15:05,639 variability in the report and the data 382 00:15:11,150 --> 00:15:07,620 set is currently too limited to allow 383 00:15:13,129 --> 00:15:11,160 for details Trend or pattern analysis 384 00:15:16,189 --> 00:15:13,139 there was some clustering of UAP 385 00:15:18,290 --> 00:15:16,199 observations regarding shape size and 386 00:15:21,590 --> 00:15:18,300 particularly propulsion 387 00:15:25,189 --> 00:15:21,600 UAP sightings also tended to Cluster 388 00:15:28,189 --> 00:15:25,199 around U.S training and testing grounds 389 00:15:29,810 --> 00:15:28,199 but we assess that this meaning just the 390 00:15:32,449 --> 00:15:29,820 clustering around U.S training and 391 00:15:34,730 --> 00:15:32,459 testing grounds we assess that this may 392 00:15:36,650 --> 00:15:34,740 result from a collection bias as a 393 00:15:38,329 --> 00:15:36,660 result of focus attention greater 394 00:15:40,069 --> 00:15:38,339 numbers of latest generation sensors 395 00:15:43,009 --> 00:15:40,079 operating in those areas meaning those 396 00:15:46,069 --> 00:15:43,019 areas are better radar and night vision 397 00:15:47,930 --> 00:15:46,079 and whatnot uh unit expectations meaning 398 00:15:50,269 --> 00:15:47,940 there's lots of people on patrol looking 399 00:15:52,069 --> 00:15:50,279 for things and guidance to report 400 00:15:53,689 --> 00:15:52,079 Anonymous meaning if you see something 401 00:15:57,290 --> 00:15:53,699 say something 402 00:15:59,329 --> 00:15:57,300 so two things there there is the the 403 00:16:01,009 --> 00:15:59,339 clustering of size shape and 404 00:16:02,810 --> 00:16:01,019 particularly propulsion but they preface 405 00:16:06,410 --> 00:16:02,820 that by saying they didn't really have 406 00:16:08,150 --> 00:16:06,420 enough enough data points to make that 407 00:16:10,910 --> 00:16:08,160 that assessment 408 00:16:12,590 --> 00:16:10,920 and then this clustering around U.S 409 00:16:14,389 --> 00:16:12,600 training and testing ground now this 410 00:16:17,210 --> 00:16:14,399 also applies to another thing they don't 411 00:16:19,550 --> 00:16:17,220 mention here which is nuclear uh we have 412 00:16:21,889 --> 00:16:19,560 all these reports from years ago of UFO 413 00:16:25,009 --> 00:16:21,899 turning off nuclear missiles and UFOs 414 00:16:27,889 --> 00:16:25,019 clustering around nuclear sites but 415 00:16:29,629 --> 00:16:27,899 again this would get the same bias here 416 00:16:31,129 --> 00:16:29,639 this collection bias which is a real 417 00:16:33,470 --> 00:16:31,139 thing it's not just a made-up term here 418 00:16:35,030 --> 00:16:33,480 collection bias is where you don't 419 00:16:36,889 --> 00:16:35,040 collect all of the data you're just 420 00:16:39,949 --> 00:16:36,899 focusing on a subset of the data for 421 00:16:42,050 --> 00:16:39,959 some particular reason as a result of 422 00:16:44,509 --> 00:16:42,060 focused attention and greater numbers of 423 00:16:46,490 --> 00:16:44,519 of sensors around these areas and unit 424 00:16:49,509 --> 00:16:46,500 expectations and guidance you know the 425 00:16:51,949 --> 00:16:49,519 the guards around a nuclear site will be 426 00:16:53,389 --> 00:16:51,959 instructed to report things in the sky 427 00:16:54,949 --> 00:16:53,399 because you know obviously it's a 428 00:16:56,930 --> 00:16:54,959 security concern 429 00:16:59,569 --> 00:16:56,940 and the same thing with the with this 430 00:17:01,370 --> 00:16:59,579 here so anyway basically potential 431 00:17:04,130 --> 00:17:01,380 patterns do emerge but they don't mean 432 00:17:08,329 --> 00:17:06,350 a handful of UAP appear to demonstrate 433 00:17:12,230 --> 00:17:08,339 advanced technology 434 00:17:15,829 --> 00:17:12,240 in 18 incidents described in 21 reports 435 00:17:17,449 --> 00:17:15,839 which I'm guessing means that 436 00:17:19,309 --> 00:17:17,459 um 437 00:17:22,850 --> 00:17:19,319 what would that be three of the 438 00:17:24,529 --> 00:17:22,860 incidents had two people or perhaps just 439 00:17:26,809 --> 00:17:24,539 one of the incidents had four people 440 00:17:29,390 --> 00:17:26,819 because they could have had 18 incidents 441 00:17:32,270 --> 00:17:29,400 uh four reports on the 18th that would 442 00:17:34,789 --> 00:17:32,280 give you 21 total reports or W3 but 443 00:17:36,970 --> 00:17:34,799 anyway not very many additional people 444 00:17:39,590 --> 00:17:36,980 are required to go from 18 to 21. 445 00:17:41,570 --> 00:17:39,600 observers report unusual UAP movement 446 00:17:43,630 --> 00:17:41,580 patterns or flight characteristics now 447 00:17:46,310 --> 00:17:43,640 uh here we have observers report 448 00:17:49,090 --> 00:17:46,320 and that kind of implies to me that it's 449 00:17:53,150 --> 00:17:49,100 all eyewitness accounts and 450 00:17:55,610 --> 00:17:53,160 no actual radar could be 451 00:17:57,710 --> 00:17:55,620 observers of the radar but then don't 452 00:17:59,630 --> 00:17:57,720 they have the radar data wouldn't we be 453 00:18:00,409 --> 00:17:59,640 able to see the data so it seems here 454 00:18:02,570 --> 00:18:00,419 again 455 00:18:04,730 --> 00:18:02,580 we're getting a single Source not only 456 00:18:06,770 --> 00:18:04,740 that it's not even an instrument uh 457 00:18:09,289 --> 00:18:06,780 we're getting eyewitness accounts 458 00:18:11,390 --> 00:18:09,299 reporting unusual UOP movement patterns 459 00:18:13,430 --> 00:18:11,400 of flight characteristics and then they 460 00:18:15,110 --> 00:18:13,440 describe them some appear to remain 461 00:18:17,330 --> 00:18:15,120 stationary and wins move against the 462 00:18:19,070 --> 00:18:17,340 wind maneuver abruptly move a 463 00:18:21,350 --> 00:18:19,080 considerable Speed without discernible 464 00:18:22,909 --> 00:18:21,360 means of propulsion and in a small 465 00:18:25,310 --> 00:18:22,919 number of cases military aircraft 466 00:18:28,490 --> 00:18:25,320 systems process radio frequency energy 467 00:18:29,810 --> 00:18:28,500 associated with UAP sightings 468 00:18:31,370 --> 00:18:29,820 so that's basically where they measure 469 00:18:33,169 --> 00:18:31,380 the RF coming from something the RF 470 00:18:35,150 --> 00:18:33,179 signal like it's broadcasting things or 471 00:18:37,010 --> 00:18:35,160 what kind of radar is putting out or 472 00:18:40,909 --> 00:18:37,020 something like that but they process it 473 00:18:45,289 --> 00:18:43,310 the uaptf holds a small amount of data 474 00:18:48,590 --> 00:18:45,299 that appear to show UAP demonstrating 475 00:18:50,029 --> 00:18:48,600 acceleration or a degree of signature 476 00:18:52,310 --> 00:18:50,039 management 477 00:18:53,990 --> 00:18:52,320 uh additional rigorous analysis are 478 00:18:55,250 --> 00:18:54,000 necessary by multiple teams or groups of 479 00:18:57,770 --> 00:18:55,260 technical experts to determine the 480 00:18:59,810 --> 00:18:57,780 nature and validity of these data so 481 00:19:01,190 --> 00:18:59,820 that means that things appear to show 482 00:19:03,049 --> 00:19:01,200 something but they don't really know if 483 00:19:05,029 --> 00:19:03,059 they do so we should look to see if they 484 00:19:06,830 --> 00:19:05,039 actually do 485 00:19:08,510 --> 00:19:06,840 we are conducting further analysis to 486 00:19:10,909 --> 00:19:08,520 determine if breakthrough Technologies 487 00:19:13,549 --> 00:19:10,919 were demonstrated see now this is kind 488 00:19:14,510 --> 00:19:13,559 of like a key part of the report they 489 00:19:16,789 --> 00:19:14,520 don't know 490 00:19:18,470 --> 00:19:16,799 if break through Technologies were 491 00:19:20,150 --> 00:19:18,480 demonstrated 492 00:19:23,029 --> 00:19:20,160 and 493 00:19:26,270 --> 00:19:23,039 a lot of people who are supporting uh 494 00:19:28,430 --> 00:19:26,280 this investigation of uaps 495 00:19:30,830 --> 00:19:28,440 are essentially saying that breakthrough 496 00:19:32,150 --> 00:19:30,840 technologies have been demonstrated like 497 00:19:34,070 --> 00:19:32,160 they're saying there are things in the 498 00:19:36,250 --> 00:19:34,080 sky that are running rings around our 499 00:19:39,049 --> 00:19:36,260 Pilots yeah doing things that we cannot 500 00:19:41,330 --> 00:19:39,059 duplicate and either we've been 501 00:19:43,190 --> 00:19:41,340 leapfrogged by another power or there 502 00:19:46,310 --> 00:19:43,200 are aliens or something like that up 503 00:19:48,470 --> 00:19:46,320 there and they don't give you any other 504 00:19:50,870 --> 00:19:48,480 options but this report 505 00:19:53,630 --> 00:19:50,880 basically says they don't know 506 00:19:56,990 --> 00:19:53,640 it's a small amount of data that appears 507 00:20:00,289 --> 00:19:57,000 to show UAP demonstrating these things 508 00:20:01,909 --> 00:20:00,299 and rigorous analysis will be needed to 509 00:20:03,110 --> 00:20:01,919 determine the nature and validity of 510 00:20:05,570 --> 00:20:03,120 this data 511 00:20:07,310 --> 00:20:05,580 and further analysis is being conducted 512 00:20:11,390 --> 00:20:07,320 maybe in the next report we'll get more 513 00:20:19,549 --> 00:20:12,950 so next 514 00:20:23,510 --> 00:20:21,289 uh this is the you know again the big 515 00:20:24,649 --> 00:20:23,520 thing I I've said it over and over again 516 00:20:26,330 --> 00:20:24,659 that there's lots of different things 517 00:20:28,669 --> 00:20:26,340 going on here and you can't just say 518 00:20:30,230 --> 00:20:28,679 uaps another problem let's figure out 519 00:20:31,909 --> 00:20:30,240 what uaps are there's all kinds of 520 00:20:33,950 --> 00:20:31,919 different things there's drones there's 521 00:20:35,210 --> 00:20:33,960 there's balloons and birds there's all 522 00:20:37,070 --> 00:20:35,220 kinds of things 523 00:20:39,289 --> 00:20:37,080 uh let's see what they say the uip 524 00:20:41,810 --> 00:20:39,299 documented in this limited data set yeah 525 00:20:43,789 --> 00:20:41,820 it's only 144 things demonstrates an 526 00:20:45,409 --> 00:20:43,799 array of aerial behaviors even though 527 00:20:47,149 --> 00:20:45,419 we've only got 104 we've got all these 528 00:20:48,529 --> 00:20:47,159 different things reinforcing the 529 00:20:50,149 --> 00:20:48,539 possibility that there are multiple 530 00:20:52,610 --> 00:20:50,159 types of UAP requiring different 531 00:20:54,529 --> 00:20:52,620 explanations our analysis of the data 532 00:20:56,870 --> 00:20:54,539 supports the construct that if and when 533 00:20:58,669 --> 00:20:56,880 individual UAP incidents are resolved 534 00:21:00,230 --> 00:20:58,679 they will fall into one of five 535 00:21:02,270 --> 00:21:00,240 potential explanatory categories 536 00:21:04,190 --> 00:21:02,280 Airborne clutter and natural atmospheric 537 00:21:07,430 --> 00:21:04,200 phenomena USG or industry development 538 00:21:10,010 --> 00:21:07,440 programs foreign adversary systems and a 539 00:21:11,870 --> 00:21:10,020 catch all other bin 540 00:21:13,490 --> 00:21:11,880 with the exception of one instance where 541 00:21:16,130 --> 00:21:13,500 we determined with high confidence that 542 00:21:18,289 --> 00:21:16,140 the reported UAP was Airborne clutter 543 00:21:19,850 --> 00:21:18,299 specifically a deflated balloon we 544 00:21:22,010 --> 00:21:19,860 currently lack sufficient information in 545 00:21:23,990 --> 00:21:22,020 our data set to attribute incidents to 546 00:21:25,789 --> 00:21:24,000 specific explanations 547 00:21:28,250 --> 00:21:25,799 uh this basically means they don't have 548 00:21:30,590 --> 00:21:28,260 high confidence in any specific 549 00:21:32,390 --> 00:21:30,600 explanation and they do have it in one 550 00:21:35,570 --> 00:21:32,400 case but not in the other ones 551 00:21:38,330 --> 00:21:35,580 apparently which is kind of interesting 552 00:21:40,430 --> 00:21:38,340 okay so the the five categories they 553 00:21:41,510 --> 00:21:40,440 break them down uh the first one you 554 00:21:43,730 --> 00:21:41,520 know I think they're listing these 555 00:21:45,230 --> 00:21:43,740 essentially in order of probability like 556 00:21:47,270 --> 00:21:45,240 you know I like to do but the most 557 00:21:50,090 --> 00:21:47,280 likely thing first 558 00:21:52,970 --> 00:21:50,100 number one Airborne clutter these 559 00:21:55,850 --> 00:21:52,980 objects include Birds hmm 560 00:22:00,169 --> 00:21:55,860 balloons recreational unmanned aerial 561 00:22:02,510 --> 00:22:00,179 Vehicles UAV uh drones basically or 562 00:22:04,490 --> 00:22:02,520 Airborne debris like plastic bags that 563 00:22:06,770 --> 00:22:04,500 model a scene and affect an operator's 564 00:22:08,270 --> 00:22:06,780 ability to identify true targets such as 565 00:22:10,070 --> 00:22:08,280 enemy aircraft you know things like 566 00:22:12,049 --> 00:22:10,080 plastic bags sometimes get blown up in 567 00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:12,059 the air one of the things that people 568 00:22:18,710 --> 00:22:15,120 reported seeing was a 569 00:22:22,010 --> 00:22:18,720 Cube inside a beach ball Cube inside 570 00:22:23,630 --> 00:22:22,020 cytosphere which you know is actually 571 00:22:24,890 --> 00:22:23,640 something that exists as a radar 572 00:22:26,930 --> 00:22:24,900 reflector on boats and could 573 00:22:29,270 --> 00:22:26,940 theoretically like a plastic bag if the 574 00:22:30,409 --> 00:22:29,280 wind is sufficiently strong be blown up 575 00:22:31,909 --> 00:22:30,419 into the air 576 00:22:33,590 --> 00:22:31,919 so there's all these things Birds 577 00:22:37,250 --> 00:22:33,600 balloons recreational unmanned aerial 578 00:22:38,870 --> 00:22:37,260 Vehicles drones or Airborne debris like 579 00:22:40,070 --> 00:22:38,880 plastic bags and these are all things 580 00:22:42,230 --> 00:22:40,080 that have been brought up before as 581 00:22:44,630 --> 00:22:42,240 possible explanations for a wide variety 582 00:22:47,029 --> 00:22:44,640 of uaps 583 00:22:49,370 --> 00:22:47,039 natural atmospheric phenomena this is 584 00:22:50,990 --> 00:22:49,380 one of my favorite little topics uh 585 00:22:53,810 --> 00:22:51,000 natural atmospheric phenomena include 586 00:22:55,610 --> 00:22:53,820 ice crystals moisture and thermal 587 00:22:57,590 --> 00:22:55,620 fluctuations that may register on some 588 00:22:59,090 --> 00:22:57,600 infrared or radar systems now the first 589 00:23:01,370 --> 00:22:59,100 one ice crystals is interesting because 590 00:23:04,789 --> 00:23:01,380 I think people mistake it as there being 591 00:23:05,930 --> 00:23:04,799 a giant chunk of ice in the sky uh I 592 00:23:08,510 --> 00:23:05,940 think this is something that the Nimitz 593 00:23:11,750 --> 00:23:08,520 encounter like like had this problem 594 00:23:14,029 --> 00:23:11,760 people think that ice crystals means big 595 00:23:15,770 --> 00:23:14,039 crystals of ice like a big slab of ice 596 00:23:17,330 --> 00:23:15,780 that you get from the from the 597 00:23:18,830 --> 00:23:17,340 supermarket but no ice crystals just 598 00:23:20,330 --> 00:23:18,840 means things like cirrus cloud high 599 00:23:22,610 --> 00:23:20,340 altitude clouds 600 00:23:25,370 --> 00:23:22,620 that are made of ice crystals 601 00:23:27,590 --> 00:23:25,380 essentially yeah very fine ice dust and 602 00:23:29,409 --> 00:23:27,600 you get Reflections off that in the same 603 00:23:32,810 --> 00:23:29,419 way that you get um 604 00:23:33,970 --> 00:23:32,820 atmospheric Halos and Sun dogs and 605 00:23:36,710 --> 00:23:33,980 things like that from the light 606 00:23:38,930 --> 00:23:36,720 refracting from them you will can also 607 00:23:40,970 --> 00:23:38,940 get the them bending light and 608 00:23:42,350 --> 00:23:40,980 reflecting light like up down down to 609 00:23:45,230 --> 00:23:42,360 the ground and you know the radar will 610 00:23:46,549 --> 00:23:45,240 give you a a false return uh and it's 611 00:23:49,190 --> 00:23:46,559 possible you might even get something 612 00:23:52,789 --> 00:23:49,200 and on the IR uh from that if you've got 613 00:23:54,890 --> 00:23:52,799 a cloud ahead of you because clouds are 614 00:23:56,630 --> 00:23:54,900 warmer than the background radiation of 615 00:23:59,750 --> 00:23:56,640 the sky they can actually appear as hot 616 00:24:02,350 --> 00:23:59,760 objects uh if you if you have no no 617 00:24:05,570 --> 00:24:02,360 context other than the sky 618 00:24:07,549 --> 00:24:05,580 uh see ice crystals moisture and thermal 619 00:24:10,909 --> 00:24:07,559 fluctuations that may register on some 620 00:24:12,590 --> 00:24:10,919 infrared and radar systems yeah uh 621 00:24:13,930 --> 00:24:12,600 thermal fluctuations I mean I guess 622 00:24:17,029 --> 00:24:13,940 that's a 623 00:24:18,950 --> 00:24:17,039 temperature inversion and what happens 624 00:24:21,169 --> 00:24:18,960 there is that the air normally gets 625 00:24:22,490 --> 00:24:21,179 colder as you get higher up but if it if 626 00:24:25,850 --> 00:24:22,500 there's part of it we get a layer of 627 00:24:29,510 --> 00:24:25,860 warm air on top of cold air you can get 628 00:24:31,370 --> 00:24:29,520 uh the the light or the radiation will 629 00:24:32,870 --> 00:24:31,380 bend down towards the colder air which 630 00:24:35,029 --> 00:24:32,880 because it's even more dense than normal 631 00:24:36,470 --> 00:24:35,039 and so you'll get more you almost get 632 00:24:38,630 --> 00:24:36,480 these Reflections off this this this 633 00:24:40,669 --> 00:24:38,640 temperature inversion or you can get a 634 00:24:44,330 --> 00:24:40,679 thing called ducting where the where the 635 00:24:46,250 --> 00:24:44,340 light or the the radar will bounce along 636 00:24:47,570 --> 00:24:46,260 this kind of atmospheric duct and can go 637 00:24:48,890 --> 00:24:47,580 a long way and give you all these weird 638 00:24:50,630 --> 00:24:48,900 returns 639 00:24:54,350 --> 00:24:50,640 and of course clouds can give you 640 00:24:58,850 --> 00:24:57,169 okay USG U.S government or industry 641 00:25:01,490 --> 00:24:58,860 development programs some UAP 642 00:25:03,230 --> 00:25:01,500 observations could be attributable to 643 00:25:06,169 --> 00:25:03,240 development and classified programs by 644 00:25:08,269 --> 00:25:06,179 U.S entities we were unable to confirm 645 00:25:11,570 --> 00:25:08,279 however that these systems accounted for 646 00:25:14,750 --> 00:25:11,580 any of the UAP reports we collected 647 00:25:17,450 --> 00:25:14,760 which is kind of interesting uh why 648 00:25:19,430 --> 00:25:17,460 would they be unable to confirm but they 649 00:25:21,350 --> 00:25:19,440 still suspect it might be the case 650 00:25:23,570 --> 00:25:21,360 they've not ruled it out 651 00:25:25,730 --> 00:25:23,580 so would they just unable 652 00:25:26,690 --> 00:25:25,740 to get into all the secret programs that 653 00:25:28,370 --> 00:25:26,700 were there because they didn't have 654 00:25:30,649 --> 00:25:28,380 sufficient classification or did people 655 00:25:32,090 --> 00:25:30,659 just not want to cooperate with um it's 656 00:25:33,409 --> 00:25:32,100 not really clear that they but they 657 00:25:34,970 --> 00:25:33,419 specifically say they were unable to 658 00:25:36,830 --> 00:25:34,980 confirm it 659 00:25:38,930 --> 00:25:36,840 which contrasts with the next uh 660 00:25:41,090 --> 00:25:38,940 possibility foreign adversary systems 661 00:25:42,769 --> 00:25:41,100 some UAP maybe Technologies deployed by 662 00:25:44,810 --> 00:25:42,779 China Russia another Nation or a 663 00:25:46,730 --> 00:25:44,820 non-governmental entity like I guess 664 00:25:48,830 --> 00:25:46,740 terrorists something like that 665 00:25:50,930 --> 00:25:48,840 uh but they don't say they were unable 666 00:25:52,669 --> 00:25:50,940 to confirm or rule out that either so 667 00:25:54,590 --> 00:25:52,679 they just believe that hangings as 668 00:25:58,370 --> 00:25:54,600 possibility 669 00:26:00,890 --> 00:25:58,380 and finally we have the other category 670 00:26:02,330 --> 00:26:00,900 although most of the UAP described in 671 00:26:05,450 --> 00:26:02,340 our data set probably remain 672 00:26:07,490 --> 00:26:05,460 unidentified due to limited data or 673 00:26:08,930 --> 00:26:07,500 challenges of collection processing or 674 00:26:10,850 --> 00:26:08,940 analysis 675 00:26:12,830 --> 00:26:10,860 we may require additional scientific 676 00:26:15,590 --> 00:26:12,840 knowledge to successfully collect on 677 00:26:17,570 --> 00:26:15,600 analyze and characterize some of them 678 00:26:19,669 --> 00:26:17,580 we could group Subs objects in this 679 00:26:22,190 --> 00:26:19,679 category pending scientific advances 680 00:26:25,010 --> 00:26:22,200 that allow us to better understand them 681 00:26:26,870 --> 00:26:25,020 the uaptf intends to focus additional 682 00:26:29,690 --> 00:26:26,880 analysis on the small number of cases 683 00:26:32,390 --> 00:26:29,700 where a UAP appears to display unusual 684 00:26:34,610 --> 00:26:32,400 flight characteristics or signature 685 00:26:37,010 --> 00:26:34,620 management signature management I think 686 00:26:39,470 --> 00:26:37,020 is just stealth capabilities like low 687 00:26:42,590 --> 00:26:39,480 observability in radar and you get this 688 00:26:43,789 --> 00:26:42,600 jittering effects on on the radar uh 689 00:26:44,870 --> 00:26:43,799 they don't know though if that's an 690 00:26:50,810 --> 00:26:44,880 actual 691 00:26:52,909 --> 00:26:50,820 artifact of the collection system so 692 00:26:54,230 --> 00:26:52,919 they're saying that perhaps science will 693 00:26:57,590 --> 00:26:54,240 advance 694 00:26:59,390 --> 00:26:57,600 so in the future we may in fact perhaps 695 00:27:02,630 --> 00:26:59,400 be able to analyze these these existing 696 00:27:04,370 --> 00:27:02,640 cases or perhaps analyze the same type 697 00:27:07,490 --> 00:27:04,380 of case better in the future like we 698 00:27:08,990 --> 00:27:07,500 will get better radar or we will get uh 699 00:27:11,570 --> 00:27:09,000 you know a better long distance systems 700 00:27:13,430 --> 00:27:11,580 or we will have multiple cameras or 701 00:27:14,750 --> 00:27:13,440 something like that things will improve 702 00:27:16,070 --> 00:27:14,760 in the future they're basically saying 703 00:27:20,210 --> 00:27:16,080 that we might be able to figure these 704 00:27:25,549 --> 00:27:22,549 UAP threatened flight safety and 705 00:27:28,909 --> 00:27:25,559 possibly National Security 706 00:27:31,250 --> 00:27:28,919 was ominous uaps pose a hazard to safety 707 00:27:33,769 --> 00:27:31,260 of flight and could pose a broader 708 00:27:36,230 --> 00:27:33,779 danger if some instances represent 709 00:27:37,669 --> 00:27:36,240 sophisticated collection against U.S 710 00:27:38,990 --> 00:27:37,679 military activities by a foreign 711 00:27:41,990 --> 00:27:39,000 government or demonstrated breakthrough 712 00:27:43,850 --> 00:27:42,000 Aerospace technology by a potential 713 00:27:45,710 --> 00:27:43,860 adversary 714 00:27:47,810 --> 00:27:45,720 uh I think again here we've got to go 715 00:27:49,549 --> 00:27:47,820 back to the executive summary on the the 716 00:27:52,010 --> 00:27:49,559 first page we're on page six now so we 717 00:27:55,370 --> 00:27:52,020 go back to executive summary and 718 00:27:57,950 --> 00:27:55,380 um it says UAP clearly pose a safety or 719 00:27:59,930 --> 00:27:57,960 flight issue and may pose a challenge to 720 00:28:01,909 --> 00:27:59,940 National Security but it says safety 721 00:28:03,110 --> 00:28:01,919 concerns primarily Center on aviators 722 00:28:04,850 --> 00:28:03,120 contending with an increasingly 723 00:28:06,409 --> 00:28:04,860 cluttered air domain 724 00:28:07,789 --> 00:28:06,419 uh this is they put this in the 725 00:28:11,930 --> 00:28:07,799 executive summary but they don't really 726 00:28:14,210 --> 00:28:11,940 see it quite so clearly in in Page Six 727 00:28:15,409 --> 00:28:14,220 let's see when aviators encounter safety 728 00:28:17,570 --> 00:28:15,419 hazards they are required to report 729 00:28:20,990 --> 00:28:17,580 these concerns blah blah blah they may 730 00:28:23,450 --> 00:28:21,000 cease their tests so uh let's say like 731 00:28:24,529 --> 00:28:23,460 saying basically uh if the pilot sees 732 00:28:25,970 --> 00:28:24,539 something they might not want us to 733 00:28:28,070 --> 00:28:25,980 report it because then they would have 734 00:28:30,590 --> 00:28:28,080 to return to base because there's a 735 00:28:33,409 --> 00:28:30,600 possible danger so they just ignore it 736 00:28:35,090 --> 00:28:33,419 uh which hopefully the new guidelines is 737 00:28:36,590 --> 00:28:35,100 kind of encouraging Pilots not to do 738 00:28:38,990 --> 00:28:36,600 that in the future 739 00:28:40,370 --> 00:28:39,000 uh but we also have UAP task force 740 00:28:42,289 --> 00:28:40,380 there's 11 reports of documented 741 00:28:44,930 --> 00:28:42,299 instances in which Pilots reported near 742 00:28:46,310 --> 00:28:44,940 misses with a UAP and remember a lot of 743 00:28:48,590 --> 00:28:46,320 what they talked about near the very 744 00:28:51,110 --> 00:28:48,600 first things are things like um 745 00:28:53,029 --> 00:28:51,120 Birds balloons plastic bags debris in 746 00:28:56,389 --> 00:28:53,039 the air things like that cluttered 747 00:28:58,669 --> 00:28:56,399 airspace drones and uh you know 748 00:29:01,250 --> 00:28:58,679 obviously all those things are are a 749 00:29:03,470 --> 00:29:01,260 problem and uh they may 750 00:29:08,570 --> 00:29:03,480 but may that those might be some of the 751 00:29:10,190 --> 00:29:08,580 11 reports not that many 11 out of 144. 752 00:29:12,169 --> 00:29:10,200 and potential National Security 753 00:29:14,029 --> 00:29:12,179 challenges 754 00:29:15,889 --> 00:29:14,039 I guess this is kind of a big important 755 00:29:17,930 --> 00:29:15,899 thing we currently like data to indicate 756 00:29:20,269 --> 00:29:17,940 any UAP are part of a foreign collection 757 00:29:21,950 --> 00:29:20,279 program this is a spying program or 758 00:29:24,830 --> 00:29:21,960 indicative of a major technological 759 00:29:26,690 --> 00:29:24,840 advancement by a potential adversary we 760 00:29:30,169 --> 00:29:26,700 continue to monitor for evidence of such 761 00:29:31,970 --> 00:29:30,179 programs blah blah blah and particularly 762 00:29:34,669 --> 00:29:31,980 the detected new military facilities 763 00:29:36,649 --> 00:29:34,679 Yeah so basically if they were foreign 764 00:29:38,029 --> 00:29:36,659 adversaries some of these cases a small 765 00:29:39,830 --> 00:29:38,039 number of them even even if it was just 766 00:29:41,750 --> 00:29:39,840 one obviously it's a problem and it 767 00:29:44,090 --> 00:29:41,760 should be should be solved but they 768 00:29:47,990 --> 00:29:44,100 don't have any data we currently lack 769 00:29:49,730 --> 00:29:48,000 any data to indicate any UAP a part of a 770 00:29:51,590 --> 00:29:49,740 foreign collection program or indicative 771 00:29:53,210 --> 00:29:51,600 of a major technological advancement by 772 00:29:54,590 --> 00:29:53,220 a potential adversary 773 00:29:59,810 --> 00:29:54,600 yeah 774 00:30:05,090 --> 00:30:02,149 okay explaining UAP will require 775 00:30:07,970 --> 00:30:05,100 analytical collection and resource 776 00:30:10,430 --> 00:30:07,980 investment this is kind of like the uh 777 00:30:12,110 --> 00:30:10,440 we need more money the UAP task force 778 00:30:13,789 --> 00:30:12,120 needs more money or 779 00:30:16,250 --> 00:30:13,799 if we want to solve this thing we need 780 00:30:18,350 --> 00:30:16,260 to put money into data collection in 781 00:30:20,029 --> 00:30:18,360 general across across the board 782 00:30:21,889 --> 00:30:20,039 so they're saying standardized things 783 00:30:23,750 --> 00:30:21,899 they're talking about employing 784 00:30:26,870 --> 00:30:23,760 artificial intelligence which would be 785 00:30:28,310 --> 00:30:26,880 great they can filter out cases 786 00:30:31,130 --> 00:30:28,320 it'd be really good if you could 787 00:30:34,190 --> 00:30:31,140 actually use AI to uh 788 00:30:36,289 --> 00:30:34,200 to take in a very large number of data 789 00:30:37,970 --> 00:30:36,299 sets I mean the problem with UFO 790 00:30:39,470 --> 00:30:37,980 Reporting historically has been that we 791 00:30:41,510 --> 00:30:39,480 get so much noise 792 00:30:42,710 --> 00:30:41,520 we especially when there's a UFO flap 793 00:30:46,070 --> 00:30:42,720 light there is right now you get 794 00:30:47,389 --> 00:30:46,080 thousands of people reporting UFOs and 795 00:30:49,850 --> 00:30:47,399 uh you know the vast majority of them 796 00:30:52,789 --> 00:30:49,860 obviously if not if not all of them are 797 00:30:54,350 --> 00:30:52,799 are fairly ordinary objects yet we want 798 00:30:55,789 --> 00:30:54,360 to find the things that actually are 799 00:30:57,649 --> 00:30:55,799 extraordinary if there's a foreign 800 00:30:58,970 --> 00:30:57,659 adversary trying to sneak drones in we 801 00:31:00,830 --> 00:30:58,980 want to be able to detect that 802 00:31:02,750 --> 00:31:00,840 particular thing and we need to filter 803 00:31:05,630 --> 00:31:02,760 out all the noise to do that and this is 804 00:31:07,669 --> 00:31:05,640 one of the the reasons back in the 1950s 805 00:31:10,610 --> 00:31:07,679 the government encouraged the debunking 806 00:31:12,649 --> 00:31:10,620 of UFOs because all the reports that 807 00:31:15,049 --> 00:31:12,659 were coming in were taking up too much 808 00:31:16,970 --> 00:31:15,059 time for the authorities to track down 809 00:31:19,330 --> 00:31:16,980 these these these essentially false 810 00:31:23,210 --> 00:31:19,340 reports of just nonsense noise 811 00:31:25,789 --> 00:31:23,220 but now we have the opportunity to allow 812 00:31:27,529 --> 00:31:25,799 all that noise in we just we just opened 813 00:31:31,009 --> 00:31:27,539 the floodgates and say yes send us all 814 00:31:33,950 --> 00:31:31,019 your UOP reports and then we have ai 815 00:31:36,230 --> 00:31:33,960 look at the reports and the AI will 816 00:31:38,090 --> 00:31:36,240 determine if any of them don't fit the 817 00:31:41,210 --> 00:31:38,100 normal patterns of things like birds and 818 00:31:44,630 --> 00:31:41,220 balloons and plastic bags and drones and 819 00:31:47,389 --> 00:31:44,640 those will get bumped up to more 820 00:31:49,669 --> 00:31:47,399 consideration to human and human 821 00:31:51,649 --> 00:31:49,679 analysis so that's a good idea 822 00:31:53,810 --> 00:31:51,659 and they developed interagency 823 00:31:55,850 --> 00:31:53,820 analytical and processing workflows to 824 00:32:00,230 --> 00:31:55,860 ensure collection analysis will be well 825 00:32:04,570 --> 00:32:02,990 okay if it's to stand the day is 826 00:32:07,009 --> 00:32:04,580 reporting jolly good 827 00:32:09,289 --> 00:32:07,019 and working to acquire additional 828 00:32:10,730 --> 00:32:09,299 reporting including from the U.S Air 829 00:32:12,289 --> 00:32:10,740 Force because most of it's come from the 830 00:32:14,389 --> 00:32:12,299 Navy it seems to be some kind of 831 00:32:16,970 --> 00:32:14,399 cultural difference between the the Navy 832 00:32:20,269 --> 00:32:16,980 and the Air Force perhaps there's more 833 00:32:22,850 --> 00:32:20,279 reports over the ocean uh for I don't 834 00:32:24,710 --> 00:32:22,860 know for a variety of reasons perhaps uh 835 00:32:26,630 --> 00:32:24,720 it's just easier to spot them against 836 00:32:29,330 --> 00:32:26,640 the ocean perhaps I don't know or 837 00:32:31,549 --> 00:32:29,340 perhaps the the Air Force 838 00:32:33,230 --> 00:32:31,559 doesn't like to report these things 839 00:32:36,889 --> 00:32:33,240 but anyway they're we're trying to 840 00:32:38,690 --> 00:32:36,899 improve that and then the FAA FAA of 841 00:32:40,370 --> 00:32:38,700 course has radar 842 00:32:44,110 --> 00:32:40,380 I'm running all the time covering the 843 00:32:46,669 --> 00:32:44,120 entire country and if there was uh UFOs 844 00:32:48,710 --> 00:32:46,679 uaps showing up on that radar it would 845 00:32:51,590 --> 00:32:48,720 be in the data so it would be good for 846 00:32:53,210 --> 00:32:51,600 get the data from them and and analyze 847 00:32:54,710 --> 00:32:53,220 it using AI would be great you could 848 00:32:57,669 --> 00:32:54,720 historically look at historically all 849 00:33:02,330 --> 00:32:57,679 the historical data and use some AI to 850 00:33:06,590 --> 00:33:05,149 alright so let's see the uip task force 851 00:33:09,909 --> 00:33:06,600 is looking for novel ways to increase 852 00:33:12,889 --> 00:33:09,919 collection of UAP cluster areas 853 00:33:15,529 --> 00:33:12,899 where U.S forces are not present as a 854 00:33:17,930 --> 00:33:15,539 way to Baseline standard UAP activity 855 00:33:21,830 --> 00:33:17,940 and mitigate the collection bias in the 856 00:33:24,889 --> 00:33:21,840 data set so that's saying basically we 857 00:33:27,830 --> 00:33:24,899 will study uaps extensively in an area 858 00:33:30,049 --> 00:33:27,840 that's not of security concern 859 00:33:31,970 --> 00:33:30,059 so we'll go out into like I don't know 860 00:33:34,070 --> 00:33:31,980 some town in Kansas that does not have a 861 00:33:38,450 --> 00:33:34,080 military base near it and we'll set up 862 00:33:41,389 --> 00:33:38,460 uh cameras to study uaps in the sky and 863 00:33:42,590 --> 00:33:41,399 we'll use that to compare against the 864 00:33:45,649 --> 00:33:42,600 results of all the cameras and The 865 00:33:48,529 --> 00:33:45,659 Radars from an actual military base so 866 00:33:51,110 --> 00:33:48,539 we'll get this Baseline reading of um of 867 00:33:53,509 --> 00:33:51,120 UAP activity from all the false 868 00:33:55,490 --> 00:33:53,519 positives things like birds and uh 869 00:33:57,889 --> 00:33:55,500 drones and whatnot and then we'll be 870 00:33:59,269 --> 00:33:57,899 able to kind of subtract that from the 871 00:34:00,889 --> 00:33:59,279 data that we get from an actual military 872 00:34:03,049 --> 00:34:00,899 site and then we'll be able to see if 873 00:34:05,810 --> 00:34:03,059 there are things that stand out which 874 00:34:09,109 --> 00:34:05,820 are actual security threats good idea 875 00:34:11,149 --> 00:34:09,119 good idea UAP task force 876 00:34:12,710 --> 00:34:11,159 and one proposal is to use Advanced 877 00:34:14,270 --> 00:34:12,720 algorithms to search historical data 878 00:34:16,270 --> 00:34:14,280 captured and sort by radar that's what I 879 00:34:19,010 --> 00:34:16,280 just said 880 00:34:21,290 --> 00:34:19,020 okay increased investment in research 881 00:34:22,790 --> 00:34:21,300 and development the UAP task force has 882 00:34:24,349 --> 00:34:22,800 indicated that additional funding for 883 00:34:26,210 --> 00:34:24,359 research and development could further 884 00:34:27,589 --> 00:34:26,220 the future study of the topics laid out 885 00:34:29,450 --> 00:34:27,599 in this report 886 00:34:31,849 --> 00:34:29,460 such Investments should be guided by a 887 00:34:34,129 --> 00:34:31,859 UAP collection strategy UAP r d 888 00:34:36,050 --> 00:34:34,139 technical roadmap and a UAP program plan 889 00:34:39,290 --> 00:34:36,060 hmm I wonder if those things are coming 890 00:34:40,669 --> 00:34:39,300 this is a preliminary report and I think 891 00:34:42,770 --> 00:34:40,679 that's pretty much the last page of it 892 00:34:44,089 --> 00:34:42,780 there's a couple of appendices but you 893 00:34:46,270 --> 00:34:44,099 know that's that's it this is uh 894 00:34:51,950 --> 00:34:46,280 essentially a seven page report 895 00:34:54,349 --> 00:34:51,960 and uh it's it's interesting because I I 896 00:34:56,569 --> 00:34:54,359 wasn't expecting it to be exactly like 897 00:34:58,370 --> 00:34:56,579 this I was expecting more of a list of 898 00:35:00,349 --> 00:34:58,380 actual cases 899 00:35:02,750 --> 00:35:00,359 I'm quite happy with it though I think 900 00:35:04,609 --> 00:35:02,760 it gives a good overview of the 901 00:35:07,010 --> 00:35:04,619 situation that we have I think it gives 902 00:35:09,770 --> 00:35:07,020 a good overview of the fact that we have 903 00:35:12,770 --> 00:35:09,780 very limited information we don't have 904 00:35:14,810 --> 00:35:12,780 very good data sets and data points that 905 00:35:16,670 --> 00:35:14,820 indicate uh some kind of advanced 906 00:35:19,550 --> 00:35:16,680 technology some kind of leapfrogging of 907 00:35:21,650 --> 00:35:19,560 Technology we have lots of things where 908 00:35:23,810 --> 00:35:21,660 things are unidentified and we need to 909 00:35:26,030 --> 00:35:23,820 figure out how to identify them we have 910 00:35:28,849 --> 00:35:26,040 these limitations of technology or 911 00:35:31,310 --> 00:35:28,859 perhaps limitations of of personnel you 912 00:35:33,730 --> 00:35:31,320 know they talk about particular things 913 00:35:37,370 --> 00:35:33,740 that let's see we go back to 914 00:35:39,950 --> 00:35:37,380 uh this executive summary summary uh 915 00:35:42,290 --> 00:35:39,960 where uaps do report unusual flight 916 00:35:44,930 --> 00:35:42,300 characteristics the observations could 917 00:35:47,630 --> 00:35:44,940 be the result of sensor errors spoofing 918 00:35:49,609 --> 00:35:47,640 Observer misperceptions and these 919 00:35:51,290 --> 00:35:49,619 require additional rigorous analysis now 920 00:35:54,950 --> 00:35:51,300 of course spoofing is a security threat 921 00:35:57,050 --> 00:35:54,960 uh sensor errors is a security threat 922 00:35:59,510 --> 00:35:57,060 too but it's not like a 923 00:36:00,950 --> 00:35:59,520 an aggressive security threat from 924 00:36:04,069 --> 00:36:00,960 outside it's just something that we need 925 00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:04,079 to improve our senses spoofing if there 926 00:36:07,849 --> 00:36:06,480 that means that a foreign adversary is 927 00:36:09,050 --> 00:36:07,859 faking these these results that's 928 00:36:11,390 --> 00:36:09,060 something that's essentially an attack 929 00:36:13,250 --> 00:36:11,400 and something that needs to be handled 930 00:36:16,130 --> 00:36:13,260 very seriously 931 00:36:18,589 --> 00:36:16,140 uh observing misperceptions also is an 932 00:36:20,690 --> 00:36:18,599 issue if The Observers the pilots are 933 00:36:24,109 --> 00:36:20,700 getting things wrong then we need to 934 00:36:27,349 --> 00:36:24,119 figure out why that happened and improve 935 00:36:31,329 --> 00:36:27,359 practices and trainings and Reporting 936 00:36:34,250 --> 00:36:31,339 analysis to incorporate that information 937 00:36:37,450 --> 00:36:34,260 so there's there's lots of real issues 938 00:36:40,370 --> 00:36:37,460 that have been identified in this report 939 00:36:42,530 --> 00:36:40,380 that need to be addressed if something's 940 00:36:44,510 --> 00:36:42,540 unidentified let's figure out how to 941 00:36:47,270 --> 00:36:44,520 identify it but we don't have evidence 942 00:36:50,150 --> 00:36:47,280 of advanced technology we have things 943 00:36:51,290 --> 00:36:50,160 that possibly indicate it but more study 944 00:36:53,990 --> 00:36:51,300 is needed 945 00:36:56,510 --> 00:36:54,000 and they never mentioned aliens 946 00:36:59,510 --> 00:36:56,520 so it's not even really a consideration 947 00:37:01,490 --> 00:36:59,520 there they were tentatively saying maybe 948 00:37:03,050 --> 00:37:01,500 a foreign adversary might have leap frog 949 00:37:04,550 --> 00:37:03,060 does but there's only a few little cases 950 00:37:06,470 --> 00:37:04,560 and we didn't really have multiple 951 00:37:09,530 --> 00:37:06,480 sensor data there except maybe in one of 952 00:37:13,430 --> 00:37:09,540 two cases with this this radio frequency 953 00:37:17,150 --> 00:37:13,440 stuff that we measured but uh not a lot